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CASE 1: 2000/2001 US Recession 
Introduction:  
The 1990s were an unparalleled period of growth in American history. Many internet companies 
were founded during this time. The spread of information technology throughout the economy 
created both real growth and a speculative bubble in the economy. While the IT effect on growth 
was real, it was hard to see using traditional measures. Robert Solow, a prominent American 
economist, seemed reluctant to hop on the IT bandwagon in the 1990s when he said, "You can 
see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” Hence, this is sometimes 
referred to as the “Solow computer paradox,” but more popularly as the “productivity paradox.” 
It was widely believed at the time that information technology boosted productivity in the 
workplace; however, methods of growth accounting
1
 did not show this. The 1990s were 
accompanied by rapidly increasing stock prices, extensive growth in the investment sector, and 
general market confidence in return on investments. In addition, wages rose for both skilled and 
unskilled workers. Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, described 
this period as “a time of irrational exuberance.” The subsequent fall of the speculative dot-com 
bubble, stock market crash, collapse in business expenditure and investments, and the 9/11  
attacks, brought the decade of growth to an end. The recession lasted for 11 months: from Nov 
2000 – Oct 2001. Unemployment peaked at 6.3% and the GDP decline (peak to trough) was 
roughly -0.3% (Kliesen, 2003). 
Procedure:  
For this project, I will use the University of Michigan‟s PSID (Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics). This is a database that collects microeconomic data on a wide array of information in 
the form of both individual and household surveys. I will use family data for this project, which 
includes figures for all members of the family unit according to the head of the household. I 
analyze changes in American consumption behavior between 1999 (pre-recession) and 2001 
(recession). Since it‟s impossible to analyze all types of consumption, I will choose a category 
that is representative of general consumption: food consumption. In a recent paper, Jonathan 
Skinner shows, using the consumer expenditure surveys (CEX) for 1972-1973, that there is a 
strong positive correlation between food expenditure and consumption (R^2 = 0.262). Using a 
log-linear regression model, the R^2 value increases to 0.395. Hence, food consumption will 
serve as a good proxy for total consumption.  
                                                          
1 Growth accounting was introduced by Robert Solow in 1957 as a way to indirectly measure the effect of increased 




I will create a balanced panel between 1999 and 2001, analyzing changes in total money spent on 
food. This total will be comprised of food eaten at home, as well as food eaten out. I used the 
PSID‟s family cross-sectional weight data in my analysis to allow for the fact that certain groups 
of individuals are over or underrepresented relative to the U.S. population. Since my goal was to 
characterize transitions of a national sample of families, I excluded some observations which 
were not a part of the national sample. I also excluded families that used food stamps, refused to 
answer, or had a total income of 0 in either of the given years. However, I did include families 
that reported a net loss in either year. I averaged the total family income between 1998 and 2002. 
I used the consumer price index values for all urban consumers (CPI-U) on BLS.gov in order to 
adjust for inflation, using 2002 as my base year. Then, I divided the income data into tertiles, and 
assigned values of “1” if the family‟s income was in the lower tertile (low-income), “2” for the 
middle tertile (middle-income), and “3” for the upper tertile (high-income).  
To analyze changes in consumption between 1999 (pre-recession) and 2001 (recession/post-
recession), I collected data on food expenditure from the PSID. The PSID has data available for 
cost of food eaten at home, as well as cost of food eaten out. Some families reported their costs 
weekly, while others reported daily, monthly, or yearly costs. Hence, for comparative purposes, 
it was important for me to normalize all the data. I converted each family‟s reported costs into 
annual costs (adjusted to 2002 dollars). Next, I computed the total cost of food per year for each 
family in 1999 and 2001 by summing the annual cost of food at home and the annual cost of 
food eaten out.  
Data Analysis:  
I performed two-sample t-tests to assess the equality of the mean values in 1999 versus 2001. For 
each income level, I compared different categories of food spending in 1999 and 2001 to see 
whether the changes in spending were significant. I also performed an F-Test to assess the 
equality of variances for the different categories of food spending in 1999 vs. 2001 for each 










TABLE 1: Average Reported Annual Cost of Food eaten at home and out of the house for 




Home $3440.12 (71.4%) $3409.71 (70.3%) 
Low income Out $1380.11 (28.6%) $1443.82 (29.7%) 
 
Total $4,820.23  $4,853.53  
    
 
Home* $4317.03 (70.4%) $4470.69 (70%) 
Middle income Out* $1818.18 (29.6%) $1916.36 (30%) 
 
Total** $6,135.21  $6,387.05  
    
 
Home $5748.31 (67.7%) $5703 (66.2%) 
High income Out* $2737.41 (32.3%) $2907.34 (33.8%) 
 
Total $8,485.72  $8,610.34  
 
*Difference of means rejected at 10% significance level 
**Difference of means rejected at 5% significance level 
 
 
These findings are peculiar because I would have expected consumption to decrease across all 
income levels during 2001, as this was the year of the recession. (Note that inflation is not a 
factor in the explanation here, since all dollars were converted to 2002 dollars.) The results show 
significant increases in food expenditure for middle income families, as well as a significant 
increase in food eaten away from home for high income families. From Table 2, you can see that 
high income families showed the greatest increase of 1.5% in food expenditure away from home 
(as a share of total food expenditure). Middle income families demonstrated a 0.4% increase in 
food expenditure away from home as a percentage of total spending on food. Interestingly, high 
income families did not show a significant change in money spent on food at home, while middle 
income families showed a significant increase in food expenditure at home. This is probably 
because middle and high income families have different price and income elasticities of demand. 
Low income families did not show a significant change in food consumption. Next, I will 
consider the change in the spending on food eaten away from home as a percentage of total food 
expenditure for each year (using mean values). Eating out should have higher price elasticity 
than eating at home since it is more expensive to eat out. Hence, it should be a good measure of 
consumer behavior during times of financial stress. 
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TABLE 2: Average Cost of food eaten out as a percentage of Total Cost of Food for different 














TABLE 3: Annual reported cost of food eaten at home, food eaten out, and total spending on 
food in 1999 and 2001 for average US families of different income classes
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2 For low income families, differences in food expenditure away from home between 1999 and 2001 were not 
statistically significant.  
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 All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2002 dollars (see CPI-U on BLS.gov). Also, I used family cross-sectional 
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TABLE 4: Cost of food eaten out as a percentage of Total Cost of Food for average US families 








Table 2 shows that, on average, all income groups spent more money eating out as a fraction of 
total food expenditure in 2001 versus 1999. However, it is important to keep in mind that only 
differences for middle and high income families were observed to be statistically significant. 
Table 3 was created using family cross-sectional weights in order to compute weighted averages 
for families across different income classes. This was important in order to form an image of the 
behavior of the average American family of a particular income class. In other words, this is the 
family which is representative of the national sample of families from a particular income class. 
Table 4 was created by using Table 3.  
These results are contrary to what I expected on two different levels. First, the results show that 
the average American family increased spending on food both at home and away from home in 
2001 versus 1999. There appears to be a general drift toward higher spending on food away from 
home as a share of the food budget. Table 4 shows that the amount spent on food away from 
home increased by 1.12% for the average American family in 2001 versus 1999. I will assume 
that food expenditure away from home and general consumption have a high R^2 value, since 
both have comparable price and income elasticities of demand (Skinner, 1987). Under this 
assumption, the results show that general consumption increased in 2001, which is contrary to 
what one would expect during a recession.  
Second, in accordance with their price and income elasticities of demand, low income families 
should be more sensitive to price and income changes than higher income families. Hence, they 
should be the most hindered by the financial stress of the recession. Using similar reasoning, if 
there is an increase in general consumption, low income families should display the smallest 
increase since they are least able to afford higher spending. The results do not support this. If you 
consider Tables 2 and 4, you will see that middle income families showed a smaller increase in 
                                                          
4 Used Table 7 to construct Table 8 by dividing money spent on food away from home by total food expenditure.  
 





Avg. US family 31.88% 
 
33% 
Avg. Low income family 30.37% 
 
31.40% 
Avg. Middle income family 30.64% 
 
31.41% 





spending on food away from home than low income families in 2001 versus 1999. From Table 2, 
we see that middle income families increased their share of spending on food away from home 
by 0.4%, while low income families showed a 1.1% increase. However, this result is not very 
strong, since the 1.1% increase for low income families is not statistically significant. From 
Table 4, you can see the average middle income family increased their share of spending on food 
away from home by 0.77%, while the average low income family increased their share of 
spending on food away from home by 1.03%. In order to try and explain these findings, I will 
examine changes in the national savings rate during the same period.  
 
Figure 1: Savings Rates from 1947-2007
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As you can see from Figure 1, the savings rate started decreasing around 1980, and continued to 
follow a downward trend through the early 2000s. One possible explanation for why the savings 
rate declined throughout the prosperous 1990s is the wealth effect. People were receiving high 
returns on their investments, particularly in the stock market, and therefore perceived themselves 
to be richer – leading to more spending and less saving. This is most likely why Greenspan 
characterized the behavior during this period as being “irrational.” Thus, even though income 
may have decreased during the recession, a larger decrease in savings may have actually 
encouraged an increase in consumption, despite the recession. However, the problem with this 
explanation is that it assumes that all families at all income levels own checking or savings 
accounts and are equally affected by changes in the savings rate. As Adam Bowman noted, 20% 
                                                          
5 This explanation was reached by collaborating with Adam Bowman, a peer at the University of Michigan who 




of US families do not own checking or savings accounts. It is likely that a considerable portion 
of the low income families that I analyzed fall under this 20%. However, my results show that 
even the low income group increased consumption during the recession. In fact, as I noted 
earlier, the low income group actually demonstrated a greater increase in their share of spending 
on food eaten away from home than the middle income group. This completely contradicts what 
one would expect, considering middle income families are more likely to own checking/saving 
accounts than low income families. One possible explanation can be seen from an investment 
standpoint. Middle income families were more likely to invest their money in stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds, and other savings vehicles than low income families. Most of these investment 
sectors suffered losses during the recession. Hence, perhaps losses in these other savings areas 
for middle income families offset the increase in consumption that one would anticipate from a 
drop in the savings rate. Next, I will consider changes in consumer confidence during the time 
period (Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 2: US Consumer Confidence from 1978-2008 (from the University of Michigan’s 





Figure 3: The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index from June 1997 to December 
2008 
The University of Michigan‟s Index of Consumer Sentiment (Figure 2) is published monthly, 
and is based on a nationally representative survey conducted through phone interviews 
(“Consumer Confidence Index,” 2010). The Conference Board (Figure 3) is an independent 
economic research organization that also publishes monthly reports of consumer confidence 
which are based on surveys of 5000 households. As you can see from Figures 2 and 3, both 
sources show that US consumer confidence fell drastically between 1999 and 2001. How can this 
be interpreted in light of the data, which shows increased food expenditure away from home (as 
a share of total spending on food)?  One possible explanation is that the effects of decreased 
savings outweighed the effects of decreased consumer confidence, hence increasing 
consumption. From Figures 1-3, you can see that declining consumer confidence does not seem 
to affect the continual decline of savings. A second explanation is that food consumption is only 
an adequate representation of the general consumption of non-durable goods. The other side of 
the picture is the consumption of durable goods. The results in Figures 2 and 3 support the notion 
that changes in consumer confidence don‟t have a significant impact on non-durable goods such 
as food.  To analyze the effect of the recession on the willingness for US consumers to purchase 
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durable goods, I will consider the effect of changes in consumer confidence on automobile sales 
(Figures 4-5). I will also consider changes in US retail sales for comparative purposes (Figure 6).  
Figure 4: U.S. Auto Sales vs. Consumer Confidence Index: 1980-2002 
     (source: Automotive Digest, 2010) 
 
Figure 5: U.S. Auto Sales: 1968-2010 
(source: Simpkins, 2009) 
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Figure 6: Retail Sales vs. Consumer Confidence Index: 1992-2007 
(source: Panzner, 2010) 
From Figure 4, you can see the positive correlation between consumer confidence and auto sales. 
Figure 5 further supports this observation. You can see that in every US recession between 1973 
and 2010, US auto sales plummeted. The largest drop in auto sales was seen after the collapse of 
the United States housing bubble which led to the 2007-2009 recession. From these trends, it 
seems that large-ticket items such as automobiles are more susceptible to fluctuations induced by 
large scale financial instabilities.  
In Figure 6, you can see the correlation between retail sales and consumer confidence. There is a 
strong connection between retail sales and consumer confidence until late 2007, where there is a 
striking divergence between the two variables. This divergence demonstrates why the consumer 
sentiment index is not a perfectly reliable measure of all consumption variables. Similarly, my 
results show a divergence between the consumer sentiment index and food consumption.  
Further Analysis 
While the above analysis sheds some light on general consumption changes for US households 
of different income strata, analyzing the transitions between relative locations in the distribution 
11 
 
of food expenditure between 1999 and 2001 may provide further insight on the findings. Who 
were the families who showed the largest increases in consumption in 2001? Which families 
decreased consumption? Were they the families who spent the least or spent the most in 1999? 
Were they families of low, middle, or high income classes? These are questions I will attempt to 
answer in this section.  
For this analysis, I used 2003 family cross-sectional weights from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The variable I will use to represent food expenditure will be “money spent on 
food eaten out as a percentage of total food expenditure.” I normalized the weights and used 
them to divide all households into quintiles based on this variable. I formed these quintiles for 
both 1999 and 2001. Next, I compared the 1999 quintile for each family to their 2001 quintile. 
Table 5 shows the transitions for the different quintiles. Table 6 was created from Table 5.  





   1999 Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 50.2 24.5 13.5 7.2 4 
2 22.4 31 26 12.6 7.9 
3 14.9 24.5 28.4 18.7 13.5 
4 7.8 13.2 23.4 33.6 22 
5 3.3 6.9 8.9 27.8 53.1 
 
TABLE 6: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households, 1999-2001 
  
2001 Quintile Transitions 
 
 
Higher Quintile Same Quintile Lower Quintile 
1999 Quintile 
   1 49.20 50.20 - 
2 46.50 31.00 22.40 
3 32.20 28.40 39.40 
4 22 34 44.40 
5 - 53 46.90 
                                                          




It is important to keep in mind that the quintiles represent money spent on food away from home as a 
percentage of total spending on food. This was necessary in order to correct for income disparities. If 
a family moves to a lower quintile, in theory this could represent two different scenarios. The first 
would be that this family decreased total expenditure on food but decreased spending on food away 
from home by a greater amount, proportionately.  The second would be that this family increased 
total expenditure on food and either decreased spending on food away from home or increased 
spending on food away from home by a smaller amount, proportionately. Table 3 clearly shows that 
this latter explanation must be the correct one, as all families displayed increases in both food 
expenditure away from home and total food expenditure. Furthermore, I will assume that spending 
on food away from home has a high R^2 value with general consumption (Skinner, 1987). Hence, for 
the purposes of my analysis, families that moved to lower quintiles in 2001 represent families that 
have decreased general consumption, and families that move to higher quintiles represent families 
that have increased consumption.  
The results show that the families who showed the greatest increase in consumption were the ones 
who consumed the least in 1999. Table 6 shows that families in the 1st quintile showed the greatest 
increase in consumption; 49.2% of them spent more in 2001 versus 1999, while 50.2% of them 
remained in the 1st quintile in 2001. Hence, roughly one in every two families in the 1st quintile in 
1999 moved to a higher quintile in 2001. Families in the 2nd quintile showed the second greatest 
increase in consumption. 46.5% of them moved to a higher quintile in 2001, while 53.4% of them 
either remained in the 2nd quintile or moved down to the 1st quintile in 2001. For families in the 4th 
quintile, 56% of them either remained in the 4th quintile or moved up to the 5th quintile. For families 
in the 5th quintile, 53% of them remained in the 5th quintile during the recession. Hence, the big 
spenders remained big spenders during the recession. Families in the 3rd quintile were the most 
interesting to analyze for several reasons. First, regression toward the mean is a confounding factor 
that may have played a role in the transitions for quintiles 1, 2, 4, and 5. Hence, the analysis of 3rd 
quintile families will correct for this, since these families are already at the mean consumption level. 
Second, these families have the most “wiggle room” since they can either move to the upper quintile 
range or the lower quintile range. Table 6 shows that 39.4%  of 3rd quintile families moved down to 
either the 1st or 2nd quintiles, while only 32.2% of them moved up to the 4th or 5th quintiles. In other 
words, the average American family was more likely to consume less in 2001 than 1999. Hence, the 
data shows that the average American family was most likely to decrease spending on food away 
from home during the recession than do anything else. This is the first time I see evidence of the 
recession in the data. The most likely explanation for this observation is that US consumer 
confidence decreased significantly between 1999 and 2001 (see Figures 2 and 3). 
Next, I did some analysis based on income level, since changes in income could have been a factor 
behind some of the observed transitions. Tables 7-8 show the quintile transitions for the different 





TABLE 7: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households, based on 
income level, 1999-2001 
   
2001 Quintile 
   
 
1999 Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 44 24.7 17.4 7.9 5.5 
 
2 25.9 26.7 23.3 13.6 10.2 
Low Income Families 3 19.5 20.8 29.7 15.4 14.4 
 
4 10.7 11.9 19.3 34 24.1 
 
5 4.7 6.6 10.8 31 46.9 
       
  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 58.5 26 7.8 3.5 3.2 
 
2 23.6 30.4 25.3 14.5 6.2 
Middle Income Families 3 12.2 27.3 28.8 20.4 11.3 
 
4 7.7 15.6 24.6 33.1 19 
 
5 2.8 8.5 7.9 28.4 52.4 
       
  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 49.7 22.6 14.4 10 2.8 
 
2 17.6 35.8 29.3 10 7.3 
High Income Families 3 12.9 25.4 26.7 20.2 14.8 
 
4 6.3 12.2 24.7 33.8 23 
 













TABLE 8: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households of different 
income levels from 1999 to 2001 
 








Quintile Same Quintile Lower Quintile 
 
1 55.5 44 - 
 
2 47.1 26.7 26.2 
 
3 29.8 29.7 40.4 
Low Income Families 4 24.1 34 41.9 
 
5 - 46.9 53.1 
     
     
 
1 40.5 58.5 - 
 
2 46 30.4 23.6 
Middle Income Families 3 31.7 28.8 39.5 
 
4 19 33.1 47.9 
 
5 - 52.4 47.6 
     
     
 
1 49.8 49.7 - 
 
2 46.6 35.8 17.6 
High Income Families 3 35 26.7 38.3 
 
4 23 33.8 43.2 
 
5 - 59.1 40.9 
 
Again, I will limit my analysis to the 3
rd
 quintile families in each income group in order to 
correct for any regression toward the mean. Table 8 shows that families in the 3
rd
 quintile across 
all income classes were most likely to spend less on food away from home in 2001. Interestingly, 
the data shows that the consumption of the average low income family was affected more than 
that of the average middle or high income family. The average low income family decreased 
consumption by 40.4%, while the average middle and high income families showed 39.5% and 
38.3% decreases, respectively. This makes sense intuitively, since low income families should be 
more sensitive to price and income changes than higher income families. These results conflict 
with the results I obtained from Tables 2 and 4, which showed that middle income families 
displayed a smaller increase in spending on food away from home (as a share of the total food 
budget) than low income families in 2001 versus 1999. However, it is important to remember 
that the figures I obtained in Tables 2-4 did not correct for regression toward the mean, such as 
15 
 
in Tables 7 and 8. Also, the results for low income families in Tables 2-4 were not statistically 
significant. Hence, it is safe to assume that the results obtained here are more indicative of the 
consumption behavior of average low, middle, and high income families.  
16 
 
CASE 2: 1990/1991 US Recession 
Introduction:  
The US recession of the early 1990s was actually more severe than the early 2000s recession. It 
lasted from July 1990 to March 1991, with unemployment peaking at 7.3% and GDP at -1.4% 
(“Unemployment Rate”; Walsh, 1993).  The recession resulted from a multitude of factors, 
including the 1990 oil price shock (as a result of the Gulf War), debt accumulation, low 
consumer confidence, and new banking regulations (Walsh, 1993). The cost of the crisis was 
approximately $160.1 billion, which led to massive debt accumulation (Walsh, 1993). 
Furthermore, between 1986 and 1989, the construction of new homes dropped by 800,000 per 
year, reaching the lowest rate since WWII (Gardner, 1994). In this section, I will conduct a 
similar analysis of the early 1990s recession as I did for the early 2000s recession.  
Data Analysis: 
 
TABLE 9: Average Reported Annual Cost of Food eaten at home and out of the house for 




Home** $3,368.20  $3,603.51  
Low income Out $1,113.60  $1,172.56  
 
Total** $4,481.80  $4,776.07  
    
 
Home $4,853.70  $4,884.31  
Middle income Out $1,478.06  $1,522.25  
 
Total $6,331.76  $6,406.56  
    
 
Home $6,178.53  $6,350.85  
High income Out $2,190.53  $2,142.37  
 
Total $8,369.06  $8,493.22  
 






TABLE 10: Average Cost of food eaten out as a percentage of Total Cost of Food for different 
income levels in 1990 versus 1992
 
TABLE 11: Annual reported cost of food eaten at home, food eaten out, and total spending on 
food in 1990 and 1992 for average US families of different income classes
7 


















     








































                                                          
7
 All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2002 dollars. Also, I used family cross-sectional weight data from 1990 (from 
the PSID) in order to create this table. 
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TABLE 12: Cost of food eaten out as a percentage of Total Cost of Food for average US families 






From Table 9, you can see that low income families showed a significant increase in money 
spent on food eaten at home. This makes sense intuitively, as bad economic times encourage the 
substitution of less expensive goods (i.e. food at home) with more expensive goods (i.e. food 
away from home). Since low income families have the highest income and price elasticities of 
demand, it makes sense that they were most likely to increase spending on food at home. From 
Table 10, you can see that spending on food away from home as a share of total food budget 
decreased by 0.2% for low income families and 1% for high income families, while it increased 
by 0.5% for middle income families. However, only the differences for low income families are 
statistically significant. Table 11 incorporates 1990 family cross-sectional weights in order to 
construct an image of the average American family
8
. Table 11 shows that the average low, 
middle, and high income families all increased spending on food eaten at home. Again, this 
makes sense since food eaten at home is less expensive than food eaten out. From Table 12, you 
can see that all families decreased food expenditure away from home as a percentage of total 
food expenditure. Since food expenditure and consumption have a high R^2 value (Skinner, 
1987), Table 12 can be generalized to assume that general consumption declined in 1992 (post-
recession). Interestingly, Table 12 also shows that the average high income family decreased 
spending on food expenditure away from home (as a percentage of total food spending) by 
1.42%. This was greater than the average middle or low income families, which showed 0.33% 
and 0.95% decreases, respectively. Recall that the new banking regulations following the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s were among the causes of the 1990/91 recession. Since 
high income families were most able to place savings deposits in savings and loan associations, 
of which 747 failed during the recession, perhaps this was why they were more impacted by the 
recession than middle and low income families.  
 
                                                          
8
 The average American family (Tables 11-12) is defined as the family which is representative of the national 
sample of American families. Note: In Tables 9-10, only mean values were analyzed. Family cross-sectional weight 








Avg. US family 26.85% 
 
25.86% 
Avg. Low income family 26.76% 
 
25.81% 
Avg. Middle income family 24.97% 
 
24.64% 





TABLE 13: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households, 1990-1992 
 













TABLE 15: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households, based on 
income level, 1990-1992 
21 
 
TABLE 16: Food Consumption (Away from Home) Transitions of US households of different 
income levels from 1990 to 1992 
 
Table 14 considers the quintile transitions for the average American family (all income classes 
included) from 1990 to 1992. Regression toward the mean is a confounding factor that may have 
played a role in the transitions for quintiles 1, 2, 4, and 5. Hence, the analysis of 3rd quintile families 
will correct for this, since these families are already at the mean consumption level. Table 14 shows 
that 38% of 3rd quintile families moved to lower quintiles in 1992, while 26.7% remained in the same 
quintile and 35.3% moved to higher quintiles. Hence, the average U.S. family was most likely to 
decrease food expenditure away from home because of the recession. Table 16 breaks down the 
analysis by income class. Again, analysis of the 3rd quintile sheds the most light on the impact of the 
recession on consumption. Table 16 shows that average low and middle class families were most 
likely to decrease food expenditure away from home due to the recession. Interestingly, high income 
families actually demonstrated the opposite trend. 35.9% of 3rd quintile high income families moved 
to higher quintiles, while 31.7% moved to lower quintiles and 31.7% remained in the 3rd quintile in 
1992. These results seem to conflict with the observed results in Table 12, where the average high 
22 
 
income family was shown to have decreased food expenditure away from home as a percentage of 
total food spending by 1.42%. One possible explanation is that families in quintiles 4 or 5 hold more 
weight in the data than the other quintiles. Hence, their behavior may be clouding the behavior of the 
other families in the mean data (Table 12), whose changes in spending may not be as large in 
absolute terms.  
Figure 7: US Consumer Confidence from 1978-2008 (from the University of Michigan’s 
Consumer Sentiment Index) 
Figure 7 shows that consumer confidence sharply decreased during the 1990/91 recession. If you 
go back to Figure 1, you can see that the savings rate was continually declining starting in the 
early 1980s. However, during the 1990/91 recession, the savings rate was approximately 8%, 
which was approximately twice as high as the savings rate during the 2000/01 recession. Hence, 
perhaps the savings rate was not low enough to stimulate the increase in consumption that was 
observed in the 2000/01 recession. If you go back to Figure 5, you can see that auto sales also 
dropped considerably during the 1990/91 recession. However, auto sales did not decrease as 




TABLE 17: Cost of food eaten out as a percentage of Total Cost of Food for average US families 
of different income classes, 1990-2001
 
 
Table 17 shows the cost of food eaten out as a percentage of total food expenditure from 1990-
2001. There seems to be a long-term trend for increased spending on food away from home 
(although the decrease in food expenditure away from home in 1992 can be attributed to the 
recession). If you go back to Figure 7, you will see that there was an upward trend in consumer 
confidence from 1990 until 2001, when consumer confidence suddenly declined (due to the 
2000/01 recession), reaching its lowest point since the 1990/91 recession in 2008. Hence, the 
results in Table 17 make sense in light of the consumer confidence data. The increasing 
consumer confidence in the 1990s supports the notion that the advent of the computer age was 
accompanied by widespread economic growth and heightened consumerism.  
Discussion:  
The strength of my findings depends on the extent to which food expenditure can be used as a 
measure of general consumption. A key point of discussion here is whether consumption can be 
equated with expenditure. Aguiar and Hurst performed a study where they pointed out that 
“consumption is the output of „home production‟ which uses as inputs both market expenditures 
and time” (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). In other words, the time spent shopping for and preparing 
food at home is a variable that can be observed in consumption but not expenditure. Aguiar and 
Hurst analyzed changes in consumption and expenditure for retirees, where they found that food 
expenditures fell by 17% after retirement while time spent on food production increased by 53%. 
Interestingly, “if one values the time of retired households at half their pre-retirement wage, the 
increase in time spent in food production for retired households is roughly the same as their 
decline in food expenditure” (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). They contrasted this with changes in 
consumption and expenditure as a result of unemployment, where they found a 19% decrease in 
food expenditures and a 5% decrease in consumption. The explanation of this difference can be 
reached through Milton Friedman‟s Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). Since unemployment 
is considered an unanticipated shock to permanent income, its effects on consumption are greater 




Hence, one of the limitations of my study is that I equated consumption and expenditure when I 
used „food expenditure away from home‟ as a measure of general consumption. One reason for 
this is that food is one of the few nondurable goods reported by the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) over an extended period of time. Secondly, the PSID does not take into 
account time spent shopping for and preparing food. For this, one can consider the Continuing 
Survey of Food Intake of Individuals (CSFII). Another limitation of using „food expenditure 
away from home‟ as a measure of consumption is that the quality of spending is not taken into 
account. For example, Aguiar and Hurst show that while retirees are less likely to eat out, this 
difference is due almost entirely to a decrease in fast food visits. In fact, they find that retirees 
are not less likely to eat at restaurants that offer sit-down meals with wait service.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of using food expenditure as a measure of general 
consumption, the fact remains that food is an indispensable good with low income elasticity. 




CASE 3: 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis in Malaysia 
Introduction:  
 
Southeast Asia is a region of incredible economic diversity. Although Malaysia is dubbed a 
subsidy economy, it somehow still maintains a competitive economy. In fact, Malaysia harbors 
the 29
th
 largest economy in the world, and is an important trading partner with the United States. 
Malaysia‟s economic diversity was especially demonstrated during the 1997/98 Asian Financial 
Crisis. The crisis halted economic development in the region and impacted economies around the 
globe. Although many economists discouraged the implementation of capital controls during the 
crisis, Malaysia did not allow its central bank to intervene in the international currency markets. 
Surprisingly, Malaysia experienced a much more rapid recovery than the other Southeast Asian 
nations. The vast majority of the literature on the East Asian financial crisis speaks of the issue 
from an aggregate macroeconomic standpoint. While such analysis is valuable, I am proposing 
that perhaps there are explanations at the household level that may enrich our understanding of 
Malaysia‟s controversial recovery. Were the capital controls the only forces at play in facilitating 
the rapid recovery? Did families and business owners react in a way conducive to the country‟s 
economic restoration? Such research is vital for policymakers and households today so that 
future financial crises can be prevented or at the least dealt with most effectively. 
 
I spent the summer of 2010 doing economic research in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The majority 
of my time in Malaysia was spent gathering primary data. In addition to obtaining quantitative 
facts and figures, I incorporated qualitative data into my analysis, since I wished to gain a deeper 
sense of the sentiment surrounding the crisis. Hence, I interviewed a diverse array of individuals, 
including Muzaffar Hisham, the deputy CEO of one of CIMB group‟s regional banks in Kuala 
Lumpur
9
. I also interviewed a former member of the National Economic Advisory Council
10
 
(NEAC). Through interviews with different bankers, professors, corporate employees, and other 
local Malaysian people, I was better able to understand the general consumer sentiment 
regarding the crisis. Through my field work, I got a much different sense of what it means to be a 




During the 1990s, the Southeast Asian nations were known as the “Asian Tigers,” since these 
countries displayed seemingly limitless growth and prosperity. Malaysia, for instance, boasted a 
real GDP growth rate of 8.5% per year between 1991 and 1997, with per capita income doubling 
                                                          
9
 CIMB group is the 5th largest financial service provider in Southeast Asia.  
10
 The NEAC was an ad hoc council established by the prime minister of Malaysia in 1997 to evaluate the urgent 
state of the economy and recommend strategic responses to improve Malaysia‟s economic sustainability in both the 
short and long run. As requested by this person, he/she will not be quoted in my study. 
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during this same span and the poverty rate decreasing from 16.5% to 6.1% (White Paper: Status 
of the Malaysian Economy,” 1999). Large capital inflows throughout the 1990s resulted in large 
scale appreciation of assets and widespread economic growth (White Paper: Status of the 
Malaysian Economy,” 1999). After a speculative attack on the Thai baht in 1997, concerns arose 
among investors that other Southeast Asian nations also had overvalued currencies (Khor, 1998). 
This decline in investor confidence led to large scale capital flight from Southeast Asia 
(estimated at $102 billion) and massive currency and stock devaluations (Khor, 1998). In 
Malaysia, for instance, the value of the ringgit went from 2.52 RM/USD in June 1997 to 4.5 
RM/USD in January 1998 (Ping and Tham, 2003). The Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) 
dropped from 1271 points in February 1997 to 262 points in September 1998 (Ping and Tham, 
2003). The country‟s GDP growth declined from +7.3% in 1997 to -7.4% in 1998. The country‟s 
per capita income dropped from RM 9.1 billion to RM 8.2 billion in the same period, while 
foreign direct investment fell from RM14.5 billion to RM8.5 billion. In addition, the trade 
surplus increased in 1998 as a result of the weaker ringgit. These figures can be seen in the table 
below (“Malaysia Economic Statistics”). 
 
TABLE 18: Summary of Macro-Economic Statistics for Malaysia, 1995-2005 
 
 
However, unlike other affected countries (i.e. Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea), Malaysia 
successfully protected itself from the extreme symptoms of a financial crisis, including mass 
poverty, high unemployment, widespread bankruptcies, and civil unrest (“White Paper: Status of 
the Malaysian Economy,” 1999).  As you can see in Table 18, there seemed to have been almost 
a complete economic recovery by 1999. Imports increased from RM69 billion to RM86 billion, 
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GDP growth increased from -7.4% to +6.1%, and per capita income increased from RM8.2 
billion to RM8.5 billion. 
 
The most widely criticized response of the Malaysian government by international economists 
during the crisis was the implementation of capital controls, of which the primary goal was to 
prevent further capital flight from Malaysia. Large scale capital flight was a serious concern of 
Malaysian policymakers, since it is estimated that a third of Malaysia‟s stock market is owned by 
foreign investors (Jomo, Ching, and Fay, 2005). One of the key features of the controls included 
banning companies from taking out foreign loans that exceeded RM5 million without the 
approval of the central bank (Khor, 1998). Companies were also prohibited from borrowing 
foreign funds to purchase domestic properties (Khor, 1998). Hence, the capital controls were 
tremendously important in that they maintained Malaysia‟s private sector at a lower foreign debt 
level (42% of GDP) relative to the other affected Southeast Asian countries, i.e. Indonesia which 
had a foreign debt of approximately 60% of its GDP (Abdelal and Alfaro, 2003). The capital 
controls also decreased interest rates in Malaysia by 4% after they were implemented (Khor, 
1998). This stimulated domestic borrowing, contrary to other Southeast Asian nations who had 
to abide by the high interest rates that were imposed upon them by the IMF (Khor, 1998). The 
capital controls also placed strict rules on the offshore exchange of the ringgit, and limited the 
outflow of returns from Malaysian portfolio investments (Jomo, Ching, and Fay, 2005). The 
capital controls are generally given credit for Malaysia‟s economic recovery, since the economy 
seemed to bounce back after they were imposed. In fact, the main index of the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange nearly doubled in the first week after the controls were set (Abdelal and Alfaro, 
















(source: “White Paper: Status of the Malaysian Economy,” 1999) 
 
The Malaysian government was also criticized by the international community for pegging the 
ringgit at 3.8RM to the U.S. dollar (Ping and Tham, 2003). However, this prevented further 
devaluation of the ringgit in the international market. 
 
The crisis was also induced via an over-extension of credit by the banking system. This was due 
in part to the high number of private banks in Malaysia. For example, in Kuala Lumpur alone 
there were over 50 banks. According to the deputy CEO of one of the region‟s largest banks, 
“borrowers were spoiled” (Hisham, 2010). Hence, the government‟s tightening of the monetary 
policy after the crisis came as no surprise.  
 
From a financial perspective, the crisis induced a liquidity squeeze. With a shortage of ringgits, 
Malaysians were forced to borrow in dollars (Hisham, 2010). Hence, the pegging of the ringgit to 
the dollar was tremendously important because Malaysian businesses could take out foreign 
debts without worry that the ringgit would continue to depreciate. In contrast to other Southeast 
Asian countries whose currencies continued to depreciate, relying on foreign debt was not an 
ideal solution to their liquidity crises.  
 
The capital controls were also important in that they helped Malaysian banks maintain high 
savings rates, at roughly four percent (“White Paper: Status of the Malaysian Economy,” 1999). 
                                                          
11
 The x-axis follows the format of DD/MM. Hence, the first date listed is August 28, 1998. The last date listed is 
March 12, 1999.  
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This lessened the severity of the liquidity squeeze in Malaysia relative to other Southeast Asian 
countries, since people were less inclined to pull their money out of Malaysian banks with the 
high savings rates in place. (Hisham, 2010) 
 
Malaysia is also unique in that it is home to Petronas, the most profitable company in Asia. 
Petronas is a nationalized oil and gas company that does business with over 35 countries. The 
presence of such a huge international corporation helped reduce the impact of the crisis on the 
Malaysian economy, since Petronas‟ profit margins remained high even during the crisis. (Jaafar, 
2010). Moreover, Malaysia is unique in that manufactured goods are a large part of the economy. 
They account for 36% of total GDP and 81% of total exports (Ping and Tham, 2003). In addition, 
roughly two-thirds of these manufactured exports are electronics and electrical goods (Ping and 
Tham, 2003). According to one Malaysian economist whom I interviewed, the export of 
electronics was further enhanced at the time of the crisis due to the “Millenium Bug” that the 
international community believed would affect the world in 2000 due to technical problems in 
computer-related products (Jaafar, 2010). As such, an upgrade of electronic and electrical 
products were needed, so the demand for electronic and electrical goods shot up prior to 2000 
(Jaafar, 2010). Hence, Malaysia‟s export market provided a continuous source of revenue for the 
economy during the crisis, mitigating the negative effects of the crisis. In fact, Malaysia‟s export 
market actually benefitted from the devaluation of the ringgit since Malaysian products became 
more competitive in the international market (Ping and Tham, 2003). However, non-export 
companies with heavy foreign debt suffered from the depreciation of the ringgit since they could 
not afford to repay their loans in foreign currencies. 
 
Furthermore, the Malaysian government took a proactive role in the banking sector during the 
crisis. Daim Zainuddin, the former Malaysian finance minister, came up with the idea to 
consolidate different banks during the crisis to help prevent the widespread collapse of weak, 
individual private banks. This was a type of bailout, since the Malaysian central bank lent money 
to banks in order to allow mergers to take place. According to one of CIMB group‟s deputy 
CEOs, these bank mergers allowed banks to “gain access to cheap funds” (Hisham, 2010). The 
central bank also placed rigid guidelines that all other banks had to follow, including limits on 
credit extension, mortgages, and other areas of micro-level financing. In my opinion, such a 
centralized banking system certainly made it easier for Malaysian policymakers to establish 
solutions to the crisis in Malaysia. However, Malaysian bankers seem to be at odds with such a 
centralized system, and most of the bankers I interviewed advocated for a more deregulated 
economic system. The deputy CEO whom I interviewed exclaimed that “We [Malaysians] need 
to bite the bullet and have deregulation” (Hisham, 2010). Despite such sentiments, Malaysians 
were not politically antagonistic at the time of the crisis. In fact, I observed quite the opposite. 
Another banker I interviewed, who was also advocating for deregulation, when asked about his 
political views at the time, said that “Malaysia needs another Mahathir” (Ghandour, 2010). 
Mahathir Mohamad was the prime minister of Malaysia during the time of the crisis, and is 
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generally given credit for Malaysia‟s recovery from the crisis. Although Mahathir advocated for 
a centralized banking system, Malaysian bankers still showed heavy support for him; they felt 
that he genuinely cared for their situation.  The same banker claimed that “Mahathir would drive 
to project sites and check them out in person” (Ghandour, 2010). He also added that “We 
[bankers] trusted that Bank Negara [the Central Bank] knew what it was doing” (Ghandour, 
2010). I think such a positive relationship between the government and the banks facilitated an 
easier implementation of an economic recovery plan. It is worth noting that most Malaysians 
who work outside of the banking sector seem supportive of a centralized government. I 
interviewed a young Malay woman who works at Petronas, who claimed that “Big government 
was the right thing to do during the crisis” (Abdul Rahman, 2010). She thought that 
centralization made it easier for the government to execute its actions “even at the minute level” 
(Abdul Rahman, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, new legislation, especially the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act in 1998, 
helped revitalize the banking sector. Danaharta was established to purchase non-performing 
loans and then sell these NPLs as government guaranteed bonds (Hisham, 2010). These NPL‟s 
were mainly a result of imprudent borrowing from foreign countries, since massive currency 
depreciation made it impossible to pay back these loans. By relieving banks and other financial 
institutions of their NPLs, they were able to continue their business of lending to consumers and 




The vast majority of the literature on the East Asian financial crisis discusses its rapid recovery 
from a macroeconomic standpoint. While the macroeconomic explanations provide valuable 
insight regarding the general situation, there may have been other factors that stimulated the 
rapid recovery. While the capital controls seem to have catalyzed Malaysia‟s recovery, it is 
important to note that the capital controls came one year after the start of the crisis. This means 
that much of the capital may have already left the country during this one year span. In addition, 
from the World Trade Organization‟s trade policy review of Malaysia in 2001 (“WTO Trade 
Policy Review – Malaysia 2001”), it seems that Malaysia‟s economy already began to stabilize 
by the time the capital controls were imposed. Hence, I will consider the consumer response to 
the financial crisis to see whether this will shed some light on Malaysia‟s economic recovery. As 
you can see from Figure 9, consumer sentiments were adversely affected by the crisis, with a 
sharp decline in 1998. However, with measures to address the crisis put into place, consumer 








(source: MasterCard Worldwide Index of Consumer Confidence) 
 
How can the rapid recovery of consumer confidence be explained? Well, after five years of 
enjoying budget surpluses, the Malaysian Government decided to adopt a budget deficit 
approach in 1999 by injecting much needed capital into the economy and launching support 
programs to protect the welfare of the lower income group (Jaafar, 2010). Even civil servants 
were given extra allowances to boost consumption (Jaafar, 2010). On the financial side, 
consumption was further boosted by the easing of monetary policy and reduction of the interest 
rates. 
 
Moreover, unique features of Malaysia‟s labor force may have contributed to the rapid recovery 
of its economy. The unemployment rate was very low in Malaysia during the crisis. In 1997, the 
unemployment rate was 2.4%. In 1998, one year after the start of the crisis, the unemployment 
rate rose slightly to 3.2% (“Malaysia Labour Force Survey”). Comparatively, during the 2007-
2010 US financial crisis, unemployment peaked at 10.6% in January 2010 (“Unemployment 
Rate”). Malaysia‟s unemployment numbers are low due to different government policies (known 
as Bumiputera policies) that favor indigenous Malaysians. Indigenous Malaysians, or 
                                                          
12
 The MasterCard Worldwide Index of Consumer Confidence measures consumer confidence twice annually. The 
range of the score is from 0-100, where a score of 50 represents neutral consumer sentiments. A score above 50 
indicates optimism, and a score below 50 indicates pessimism. The sample set is a random selection of 
approximately 400 Malaysian people. 
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Bumiputeras, comprise about 50-55% of the population (“Malaysia Labour Force Survey”). For 
example, one of these Bumiputera policies gives indigenous Malaysians heightened job security. 
Although such policies may result in complacency and lower efficiency in the workplace, low 
unemployment is undoubtedly a safeguard during times of financial stress, since there is less fear 
of job loss (Hwee, 2010). As an interesting side note, recently the favoring of Bumiputeras by 
the Malaysian government has faced criticism, especially among Malaysians of foreign descent. 
For example, I spoke with a young Iranian immigrant who feels that she has no chance of finding 
a job in Malaysia since she is not ethnically Malay. I also interviewed Aw Kong Hwee, a 
professor at HELP University in Kuala Lumpur. He pointed out that there is heavy affirmative 
action in the education sector that favors Malaysians of Malay descent, especially when it comes 
to college admissions. In his opinion, unless the current dominant political party (UMNO) is 
defeated in the next round of elections, the Bumiputera policies are likely to persist. 
 
In an interview with a young Malay woman who works at Petronas, I asked her if she recalls a 
change in her spending habits during the crisis. She responded by saying, “My parents were 
government servants so we weren‟t affected” (Abdul Rahman, 2010). This supports the notion 
that the Bumiputera policies were a measure of security for ethnic Malays during the financial 
crisis. Since Malays felt a high degree of job security, they did not feel compelled to change their 
consumption behaviors, hence lessening the severity of the recession. She also added that “the 
government put in money to support the job placement of unemployed persons” (Abdul Rahman, 
2010). Hence, even the small percent of Malays who lost their jobs could fall back on the 
government for further job placement.  
 
In another interview with an Economics professor at the University of Malaya, he stated that “the 
government machinery went all out” during the crisis (Cheok, 2010). He said that they would 
play My Way by Frank Sinatra on television to give people confidence that the government knew 
what it was doing. Although such information may escape the macroeconomic statistics, I think 
it says a lot about the nature of the Malaysian people‟s confidence in their government. In 
contrast, the situation was much different in Indonesia, the Southeast Asian nation that was hit 
the hardest from the Asian Financial Crisis, with GDP growth of -13.7% in 1998 (“White Paper: 
Status of the Malaysian Economy,” 1999). At the time of the crisis, Suharto was the president of 
Indonesia, having held his post for 31 years until he was forced to resign following mass 
demonstrations in 1998. According to the Economics professor I interviewed, “In Indonesia, 
people knew Suharto was corrupt. At least Mahathir [the PM of Malaysia during the crisis] kept 
his people happy. He was the first commoner to be prime minister, and people loved him for 
that” (Cheok, 2010). Next, I will consider expenditure data for Malaysian households (Table 19). 







TABLE 19: Average monthly expenditure per household, Malaysia, 1993/94 - 2004/05 
 
 





TABLE 20: Annual reported cost of food eaten at home, food eaten out, and total spending on 




*Adjusted to 2004/05 ringgits 
 
 












                                                          
13
 All values reported in 2004/05 Malaysian ringgits (RM) 
14
 Data for average US Family taken from Table 17. 
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Tables 20-22 demonstrate some interesting results. First, relative to US families, Malaysian 
households spend a larger portion of their food budgets eating away from home (Table 22). This 
is surprising, considering the median annual household income in Malaysia is approximately 
$13,930 (in 2010 USD), while the median annual household income for the 4326 US families 




It‟s also important to note that the cost of living in Malaysia is approximately 2-3 times cheaper 
than the United States (“Cost of Living Index by Country,” 2011). Hence, these figures seem to 
show that Malaysian households consume more than US households, assuming we use food 
expenditure as a proxy for general consumption. From my personal experience in Malaysia, I 
believe these differences can be explained culturally. Communal eating is a very large part of 
Malaysian culture. Hence, eating out in Malaysia is more common than in the US, where many 
families restrict eating out except on weekends and holidays. In Malaysia, mamak stalls are 
found everywhere. These are roadside eateries that serve cheap food and beverages 24 hours per 
day and 7 days per week.  Kopi Tiams are also very popular in Malaysia; these are Malaysian 
Chinese coffee or breakfast shops where many people stop in the morning to get cheap breakfast, 
which may include eggs, noodles, or the extremely popular Nestlo Ice drink (a delicious malt 
chocolate drink). From my living experience in Malaysia, I noticed that it was actually cheaper 
to eat out than to buy groceries. One of the reasons for this is that most items at the grocery store 
are imported and therefore more expensive. Of course, there are cheaper local brands that you 
can buy, but not for much less than food at local mamaks or Kopi Tiams. Hence, it is no surprise 
that most Malaysians opt to spend their money on fresh food at local eateries, rather than 
similarly priced items at the store. 
 
Table 22 also shows an interesting point of difference between US and Malaysian households. 
US households display a long-term trend of increased spending on food away from home during 
1990-2001. If you go back to Figure 7, you will see that there was an upward trend in US 
consumer confidence from 1990 until 2001 (except for the decrease in consumer confidence in 
1992 due to the 1990/91 recession). Hence, it seems as if the consumption behavior of US 
households is a function of consumer confidence. On the other hand, the consumption of 
Malaysian households does not seem to be a function of consumer confidence. From Table 21, 
you can see that Malaysian households actually consumed the most during the financial crisis 
years (1998/99), when consumer confidence was lowest (see Figure 9). In 1998/99, the average 
Malaysian household spent 35.78% of its total food budget on food away from home. 
 
                                                          
15
 I calculated the median annual Malaysian household income by using RM 2,830 as the median monthly 
Malaysian household income in 2010 (Mahavera). Then I used an exchange rate of 0.3108597 ringgits per USD, 
which I calculated as an average exchange rate over a 12-month span in 2010 (“Exchange Rates”). 
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I believe the comparison between US and Malaysian household food expenditure is inconclusive. 
While food expenditure away from home is indicative of general consumption for US consumers 
(Skinner, 1987), it may not be a good measure of general consumption for Malaysian consumers, 
due to the inherent cultural differences between the two countries. Regardless of whether the 
economic times are good or bad, Malaysian culture emphasizes communal eating, and Malaysian 
society offers inexpensive eateries that allow for this cultural expression. Hence, future studies 
should be conducted to establish other measures of general consumption for Malaysian people. 
In conclusion, my research has demonstrated many possible explanations for the resilience of the 
Malaysian economy that was observed after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98. I believe that 
the true explanation is most likely a combination of all the possible explanations.   
 
First and foremost, the capital controls were important in that they prevented further capital 
flight from Malaysia, maintained Malaysia‟s foreign debt at a low level, and prevented further 
depreciation of the ringgit. Malaysia‟s vibrant export market benefitted from the depreciation of 
the ringgit and therefore acted as a buffer during the crisis. Furthermore, the presence of a large 
centralized government mitigated the negative effects of the crisis. The government facilitated 
many bank mergers in order to prevent widespread bank failures. The government also relieved 
many financial institutions of their non-performing loans, which allowed them to continue to 
operate. The government also increased its spending during the crisis, which helped stimulate the 
economy and restore consumer confidence. The government‟s Bumiputera policies also served to 
maintain Malaysian confidence in the job market. As a result, the majority of Malaysian people 
were not politically antagonistic at the time of the crisis, but rather, showed overwhelming 
support for the government. Finally, I believe that consumerism is a large part of Malaysian 
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